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THE TIMING OF WELFARE PAYMENTS AND INTIMATE
PARTNER VIOLENCE
LIN-CHI HSU
∗
I examine transfer schedules for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program and find a causal relationship between the time directly after welfare
payments and intimate partner violence against women. This study supports the hypoth-
esis that the husband uses threats of violence as an instrument to gain control over the
allocation of household resources, and suggests that the increased incidence in physi-
cal violence after welfare payments is associated with alcohol use. Additionally, I find
that states that pay TANF recipients twice a month do not have this effect on threats of
violence. This suggests that smaller, more frequent payments may reduce the husband’s
incentive to use verbal violence as a bargaining tool. (JEL I38, J18, J12)
I. INTRODUCTION
Violence against women not only inflicts
physical and psychological harm on the victim,
but also harms the next generation. For instance,
a newborn whose mother experiences domestic
violence weighs significantly less than average,
and prenatal assault has led to a 1.2% increase
in fetal death (Aizer 2011). Domestic violence
is also costly. In terms of medical services and
forgone productivity, the annual cost of domes-
tic violence in the United States is estimated
to be $5.8 billion (National Center for Injury
Prevention and Control 2003).
Many household bargaining models portray a
husband who uses violence or threats to extract
resources. A noncooperative bargaining and sig-
naling model developed by Bloch and Rao (2002)
suggests that in dowry-based societies such as
India, the husband uses violence to signal his dis-
satisfaction in order to gain further dowry pay-
ments from the bride’s family. A more recent
study (Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro
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2013) modifies Bloch and Rao’s model and pre-
dicts that an increase in the female partner’s
income will lead to more threats—but not more
physical violence—from her spouse. In this arti-
cle, I study the impact of the timing of welfare
payments on intimate partner violence (IPV) in
the United States.
Welfare transfers increase the recipient’s
spending immediately (Stephens 2003). Because
of the difference between genders in consump-
tion behavior (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales
1997; Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas 2009),
I test the hypothesis that men use violence to
control the resources granted by a welfare trans-
fer. To explore this idea, I evaluate the timing
of welfare payments’ influence on domestic
violence by exploiting exogenous state-level
variation in welfare payment schedules.
This study addresses some empirical chal-
lenges in the literature. First, most studies of
the relationship between welfare transfers and
domestic violence have used cross-sectional data,
which do not account for the timing of welfare
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EBT: Electronic Benefit Transfer
IPV: Intimate Partner Violence
IRR: Incidence Rate Ratio
NIBRS: National Incident-Based Reporting System
SNAP: Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program
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payments and the timing of violence. The major-
ity of welfare recipients have less income and are
less educated, on average, and may have other
unobservable characteristics that are correlated
with domestic violence reports. Without account-
ing for these unobserved characteristics, we can-
not construct a causal relationship between wel-
fare and domestic violence. Second, much of the
literature uses survey data, whichmay suffer from
small sample size, false reports, and a lack of
detailed incident information. Lastly, the timing
of other income, such as paychecks, may over-
lap with welfare transfers, and the receipt of other
income could affect domestic violence reports in
a similar fashion; this could affect all working
families, not only those that receive welfare trans-
fers. When the wife receives her paycheck, the
husband has a similar incentive to use violence
to gain control of the money based on instru-
mental violence theory; if the wife receives a
paycheck and the welfare transfer at the same
time, the husband has even more motivation to
use violence. However, most studies of the timing
of welfare payments do not control for the most
common timing of paychecks. Without consider-
ing this paycheck effect, the estimated effect of
welfare transfers on domestic violence may cap-
ture both the effect of welfare transfers and this
secondary effect.
To overcome these challenges, I apply three
methods. First, I use a survey of state-level wel-
fare payment schedules to develop an index that
represents the number of days since Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipi-
ents’ most recent payment. This measure repre-
sents the exogenous variation in TANF recipient
transfers between states. Second, I build a daily
count of IPV for each agency—that is, police
jurisdiction—by using panel data from aggre-
gated official police reports. This also allows me
to distinguish physical violence from verbal vio-
lence and, as a result, better categorize the extent
of IPV. Lastly, I control for the most common
paycheck timings to separate a worker’s pay-
check effect from any TANF-based effect.
The study demonstrates an increase in reports
of male-on-female assault and intimidation
shortly after receiving welfare payments. As
noted previously, my findings are consistent
with instrumental violence theory, in which
the husband uses violence as an instrument to
control the wife’s behavior or control house-
hold resources (Bloch and Rao 2002; Bobonis,
González-Brenes, and Castro 2013; Eswaran and
Malhotra 2011; Felson and Messner 2000). This
effect dominates the predicted effects in Farmer
and Tiefenthaler’s (1996) noncooperative model,
in which the woman’s threat point increases
as her income increases. At the same time, her
tolerance for violence decreases, and she is more
likely to leave the abusive relationship.
When the analysis is restricted to sober offend-
ers, I find an effect for intimidation but not for
assault. This suggests that threats of violence
are used as an instrument to control household
resources; however, physical violence may be a
consequence of increased alcohol consumption
around the time of welfare receipt. Addition-
ally, I find evidence to suggest that states that
pay welfare recipients more frequently do not
experience an increase in male-on-female intimi-
dation shortly after receiving welfare payments.
I conjecture that frequent, small welfare pay-
ments may reduce the offender’s incentive to
issue threats.
II. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND INCOME
Economic theories of domestic violence are
built on game theoretic models of marriage.
The earliest household bargaining models treat
marriage as a cooperative game, and household
demand results from household resources and the
resources held by each spouse. If one’s utility
in the marriage is less than the maximum level
of outside-marriage utility (threat point), then
one chooses to divorce. The household resource
allocation fits the husband’s preference more if
the husband has a higher threat point (Manser
and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981).
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) provide a separate-
spheres bargaining model with a noncooperative
equilibrium taking the place of divorce.
In addition to the threat point that determines
the family resource distribution, theorists also
predict that violence will change the household
resource allocation. IPV can be explained as an
instrument for controlling the spouse’s behav-
ior or as a way to release frustration, that is,
expressive violence. Expressive violence theory
suggests that the offender effectively pays the
victim for violence, while instrumental violence
theory argues that the offender uses violence or
threat as a tool to extract money from the vic-
tim or to control the victim’s behavior (Bloch
and Rao 2002; Bobonis, González-Brenes, and
Castro 2013; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Fel-
son and Messner 2000). Within this framework,
violence decreases the offender’s utility ceteris
paribus, but increases his power. Bloch and Rao
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(2002) build a noncooperative bargaining and sig-
naling model of dowries and family violence in
which the husband has private information about
his marital satisfaction. In India, for instance, a
dissatisfied husband may use violence as a tool
to signal his dissatisfaction—and hence collect
a larger dowry—from the bride’s parents. Using
survey data collected from Southern India, Bloch
and Rao find that wives from richer families are
more likely to be beaten by their husbands.
Moreover, Tauchen, Witte, and Long (1991)
build a noncooperative family decision-making
model that incorporates violence. This model
implies that the effect of income on IPV depends
on whether the woman’s reservation utility is
binding. Using a series of 125 interviews with
women who had experienced physical IPV, they
find that for low-/middle-income households, an
increase in the wife’s income is negatively corre-
lated with IPV, which suggests that the man must
pay more for violence when the woman’s outside
option is binding. For high-income households,
the effect of income on IPV depends on who in
the household earns most of the income. If the
husband earns most of the household income, an
increase in the wife’s income decreases IPV. If
the wife brings in most of the household income,
an increase in the wife’s income increases IPV.
However, using a woman’s income as a
proxy for bargaining power is problematic. A
woman’s observed income at the bargaining
equilibrium may differ from her income at the
threat point; for instance, a divorced woman
is more likely to work than a married woman
(Pollak 2005). Another common problem is
reverse causality. For example, a woman’s
income often relies on her physical health, but
her physical health depends on whether her
husband uses violence. Wage rates or potential
wages, therefore, are considered to be better
estimates of bargaining power. Using California
inpatient hospital data, Aizer (2010) finds that
a decrease in the gender wage gap decreases
domestic violence. This study tackles the issue
of the endogeneity of income by focusing on
exogenous welfare-transfer schedules.
Other than her financial status, a woman’s edu-
cation and age at first marriage also influence
domestic violence. Based on survey data col-
lected in Dhaka, Bangladesh, Heath (2014) finds
that among women with less education, women
who marry young and working women are corre-
lated with higher domestic violence.
In contrast to instrumental violence theory,
the theory of expressive violence argues that the
offender uses violence to relieve frustration and
otherwise gain utility. Stress from work, high
temperatures, an increase in the victim’s income,
or even unexpected outcomes of sporting events
can induce domestic violence. Card and Dahl
(2011) show that in the United States, unex-
pected local professional football losses are asso-
ciatedwith a 10% increase in IPV against women.
Also, if the wife’s economic status threatens the
husband’s family status, the “backlash” theory
predicts higher family violence: When the wife
becomes more economically independent, the
insecure husband resorts to violence. The effect
of the wife’s economic status on family violence
depends on the husband’s economic status. One
indicator of women’s economic status is labor
force participation. The wife’s labor force partic-
ipation reduces the likelihood of family violence
when the husband is employed—but increases
the risk of family violence when the husband is
unemployed (Macmillan and Gartner 1999).
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND WELFARE
A. Empirical Studies of Welfare Transfers and
Domestic Violence
The effect of welfare transfers on domestic
violence is complex. It can depend on the hus-
band’s education, the wife’s education, the rela-
tive spousal education, the spousal age gap, the
transfer size, and the timing of the transfer. The
wife’s education is negatively correlated with the
likelihood of being assaulted by the husband.
Hidrobo and Fernald (2013) find that randomized
roll-out cash transfers in Ecuador decrease psy-
chological violence received by a wife if her edu-
cation is greater than primary school. A woman
with higher education has higher potential wages,
and therefore an increase in income reduces
domestic violence because she is more likely to
leave an abusive relationship. The effect of a cash
transfer is ambiguous, however, if the wife’s edu-
cation is less than or equal to primary school.
Large transfers are often associated with an
increase in domestic violence. Angelucci (2008)
studies the effect of the Mexican Oportunidades
welfare program on domestic violence, and finds
that a relatively large welfare transfer increases
physical violence against women. Meanwhile, a
relatively small welfare transfer reduces physical
violence—but increases threats—by husbands.
However, the decrease in physical violence
caused by transfers may be temporary. By
studying the same welfare program, Bobonis,
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González-Brenes, and Castro (2013) demon-
strate that women who receive welfare transfers
experience less physical violence in the short
run, but there is no significant difference in the
long run.
B. Welfare Payment Timing and Domestic
Violence
The timing of transfers is an important factor
in studying the pattern of violence. For instance,
Stephens (2003) finds that households increase
spending immediately after receiving a Social
Security check. Foley (2011) studies the rela-
tionship between crime and timing of welfare
payments from TANF, the Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance Program (SNAP/food stamps),
and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 12
U.S. cities. He hypothesizes that welfare recipi-
ents in states with monthly welfare transfers have
enough resources at the beginning of the month,
but they may exhaust the welfare transfer and
supplement it with criminal income at the end of
the month. To support this, he finds that finan-
cially motivated crime is lower during the first 10
days of the month in early payment states.
IPV can also be viewed as a financially
motivated crime since abusers use violence
as an instrument to take resources from their
victims. Alternatively, abusers may be paying
their victims to endure violence without exit-
ing the relationship. Either way, money plays
a significant role in domestic violence. A nat-
ural experiment in a British welfare program
(Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997) shows that
women’s consumption behavior is different from
men’s consumption behavior. In ruralMexico, for
instance, welfare transfers controlled by women
are more commonly spent on investments in their
children as opposed to short-term consumption
(Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas 2009). Because
of the differences in consumption behavior
between male and female household members,
there is a strong incentive to use violence to con-
trol resources immediately following receipt of a
welfare transfer. Using Canadian crime reports in
14 Canadian census metropolitan areas, Cormier
(2009) finds that reports of IPV increase soon
after social assistance transfers are received.
C. Theoretical Approaches
Household bargaining models emphasize the
importance of outside options in resource allo-
cation decisions. If a woman’s outside option
improves, the woman receives better treatment
to avoid a breakdown in bargaining, which is
generally interpreted as divorce (Aizer 2010;
Tauchen, Witte, and Long 1991). However, some
womenwith little bargaining power cannot afford
a divorce. Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro
(2013) construct a household bargaining model
with private information in which the husband
uses threats of violence to signal his marital dis-
satisfaction. In their model, intimidation is a form
of verbal violence that reduces both partners’
utilities, but the man can use such threats credi-
bly to induce favorable bargaining results. When
the woman receives the welfare transfer, Bobo-
nis et al.’s model predicts that there will be an
increase in intimidation without associated phys-
ical violence, since the husband can extract more
potential rents with verbal violence.
To examine the impact of welfare transfers on
IPV for women with low bargaining power, I use
exogenous policy variables to test the relationship
between income flows and IPV. This study is the
first to carefully estimate the impact of welfare
payments on IPV by using data from a large and
representative sample of households. In doing
so, I provide unique evidence to support a key
prediction of instrumental violence: that the man
will use threats to secure a monetary transfer
when the woman receives income. This study
also provides evidence for a potential benefit of
increasing the frequency of welfare transfers.
IV. DATA AND METHODS
A. Overview of the TANF Program
TANF was previously known as Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children before welfare
reform in 1996. Needy families with at least one
dependent child are eligible for TANF, but eli-
gibility varies across states; in general, if the
family’s income or assets are below the state’s
minimum subsistence level, it may qualify for
the TANF program. For example, in Washington
State, the maximum income for initial eligibil-
ity for a family of three was $1,122 per month,
and the asset limit was $1,000 as of July 2008.1
In the United States, the monthly average earned
income was $839 for TANF families with income
in Fiscal Year 2008.2
1. Resources counted include checking and saving
accounts, stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and vehicle equity of
more than $5,000.
2. From the Characteristics and Financial Circumstances
of TANF Recipients database maintained by U.S. Department
of Health & Human Services.
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TANF provides needy families with medi-
cal services and temporary cash assistance; the
amount of the cash benefit depends on the fam-
ily’s size, income, assets, and expenses.3 The
average monthly welfare payment per recipient
household in the United States was $383 in Fis-
cal Year 2008. The recipient is required to begin
working within 2 years, and cannot receive the
benefit for more than 60 months during his or
her lifetime.
In Fiscal Year 2008, the total number of fam-
ilies receiving TANF cash benefits was almost
2 million. Among adult recipients, 87.3% were
female, 35.2% were white, 35.0% were African
American, and 23.3% were Hispanic. In Fiscal
Year 2008, among adult recipients, 70.4% were
single, 13.3% were married, 9.9% were sepa-
rated, 0.5% were widowed, 5.9% were divorced,
25.9% were employed, and 46.8% were unem-
ployed. In Fiscal Year 2008, among families
receiving TANF benefits, 3.8% were two-parent
families, 48.7% were one-parent families, and
47.5 % were child-only families.4
The timing of TANF payments is set at the
state level, and recipients cannot choose the trans-
fer’s timing. If payments are staggered for differ-
ent recipients, the timing of a specific recipient’s
transfer may depend on the last digit of the recip-
ient’s Social Security number or the first letter of
the recipient’s last name. Because TANF recipi-
ents cannot affect the timing of welfare payments,
I treat state-level variations in TANF payment
schedules as exogenous with respect to aggre-
gated reports of domestic violence.
There are two reasons to study the timing of
TANF payments. First, the TANF program tar-
gets low-income families with children, while
other major social welfare programs target indi-
viduals instead of families. For example, SNAP
gives people with low income and resources a
monthly benefit to buy food, and SSI provides
benefits to adults and children who have low
income and resources. Second, women from low-
income families are more likely to be victims of
domestic violence; females with annual house-
hold incomes around $10,000 are victimized five
3. A household’s expenses depend on the cost of living
in the state. Differences in average TANF transfers, there-
fore, may not reflect differences in the purchasing power of
those transfers.
4. Statistics are calculated from caseload data maintained
by the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. Child-
only families are cases in which the caretaker is a nonparent
relative, or the parent does not receive the benefit. Similarly,
one- and two-parent families count the number of recipients,
not necessarily the number of adults in the household.
times as often as those with annual household
incomes around $30,000 (Zawitz 1994). Also,
women who receive welfare benefits are more
likely to experience IPV. Based on survey data
from Michigan, 63% of female TANF recipients
had experienced physical violence by their part-
ners in their lifetime; 61% had received threats
from their partners in their lifetime; and 51%
had experienced severe physical violence by their
partners in their lifetime (Tolman and Rosen
2001). In addition, the majority of female fam-
ily violence victims live with children (Kimerling
and Baumrind 2004).
I conducted a survey of TANF administra-
tors, managers, or specialists in most states. In
the survey, I asked the respondent’s title, the
state’s TANF payment method(s),5 the frequency
of payments, whether the state staggered pay-
ments among recipients, and the transfer delivery
day.6 Table 1 shows the TANF transfer deliv-
ery day, frequency, whether the payment is stag-
gered among recipients, number of recipients per
capita, and the maximum monthly benefit for a
family of three without income for each state in
the sample. Of the 21 states, nine states deliver on
the 1st calendar day of each month,7 four states
deliver on the 1st business day of each month,
one state pays on the 30th day, three states stag-
ger payments from the 1st to the 3rd day of each
month, one state staggers payments from the 1st
to the 5th day of each month, and three states pay
all recipients on the same day, but twice a month.
In some states (e.g., Wisconsin and New Hamp-
shire), the delivery day may overlap with the tim-
ing of a monthly or twice-monthly paycheck, for
example, the middle or end of the month. To bet-
ter view variations in TANF delivery dates among
states, see Figure 1 for TANF delivery schedules.
I use this payment schedule to calculate the
average number of days since the last payment,
hereafter called “index.” If the state pays recip-
ients on more than 1 day and staggers payments
5. In most states, recipients receive TANF payments
through electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards or debit cards;
technically, every household member would have access to
the EBT card. According to national TANF data, in 2010 the
number of female recipients aged over 20 was 5.5 times the
number of male recipients aged over 20.
6. Some states pay on the first calendar day with an EBT
card and the first business day with a check. In this case, I
calculate the average number of days since the last payment
using the first calendar day as the delivery day.
7. There are several plausible explanations why so many
states issue payments on the first of the month, including
administrative ease, major expenses such as rent coming due
around that time, and alignment with paycheck income.
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TABLE 1
TANF Cash Assistance Delivery Schedule, Participation Rate, and Maximum Monthly Benefit
State
Frequency
per Month
Delivery
Day
Staggered
among
Recipients
Recipient/
Capita
(%)
Maximum Monthly
Benefit for a
Family of 3 with
No Income ($)
Arkansas 1 1 No 0.68 204
Colorado 1 1–3 Yes 0.42 356
Connecticut 1 1–3 Yes 0.93 560
Iowa 1 1 No 1.28 426
Kansas 1 1 No 1.12 429
Louisiana 1 1–5 Yes 0.52 240
Maine 1 1 No 1.82 485
Montana 1 1 No 0.85 472
New Hampshire 2 15, 30 No 0.73 625
North Dakota 1 1a No 0.88 477
Ohio 1 1a No 1.59 410
Oregon 1 1 No 1.17 514
Rhode Island 2 1,16 No 1.76 554
South Carolina 1 1a No 0.86 263
South Dakota 1 1a No 0.77 539
Tennessee 1 1 No 2.28 185
Texas 1 1–3 Yes 0.47 244
Vermont 2 1, 15 No 0.99 640
Virginia 1 1 No 0.88 320
Washington 1 1 No 1.89 562
Wisconsin 1 30 No 0.67 628
Notes: “Staggered among recipients” means the TANF payment does not pay all recipients on the same day. TANF caseload
data are from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services for October 2008. Population data are from the Population
Division, U.S. Census Bureau for 2008. Maximum monthly benefit is from the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database for
2008. Recipients per capita are 1.27% in the United States.
aStates deliver TANF payments on the first business day of each month.
among recipients, I assume that an equal amount
of people are paid on each transfer day. See
Appendix A in Appendix S1, Supporting Infor-
mation, for a detailed example.
The ideal way to choose a study sample
would be to select cities with high recipient rates.
However, city-/county-level TANF caseloads are
not available in government publications. Fewer
recipients in sample cities would create noise, but
should not bias estimations.
B. The National Incidence-Based
Reporting System
Data for my empirical analysis primarily
come from police reports of domestic violence
in the National Incident-Based Reporting Sys-
tem (NIBRS).8 The NIBRS is part of the FBI’s
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Program, which
records all criminal incidents reported by par-
ticipating police agencies. In 2006, NIBRS data
included 25% of the U.S. population. Each inci-
dent report provides detailed information on the
8. Crime data for Texas are from the Family Violence
Report of the Texas Department of Public Safety.
victim, the offender, and the incident. There are
two advantages to using the NIBRS. First, I am
able to differentiate the types of domestic vio-
lence by physical violence and verbal violence.
Second, the NIBRS includes incident dates,
which allows me to exploit the pattern of daily
domestic violence. UCR data, in contrast, are
only available at the monthly level, and still other
survey data may only ask the respondent whether
she had been assaulted by her husband in the
previous 12 months. Such broad categories make
it difficult to examine the effects of daily timing.
One limitation of the NIBRS is that it only
includes domestic violence that was reported to
police; victims may choose not to involve the
police because they consider the incident to be a
personal matter or want to protect the offender.9
The change in reported crime—that is, the daily
variation in IPV reports—may be due to a change
in real crime incidence or a change in report-
ing behavior. If the change in reporting behavior
9. About 60% of domestic violence cases were reported
to police between 1998 and 2002, based on the National
Crime Victimization Survey (Durose et al. 2005).
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FIGURE 1
TANF Cash Assistance Delivery Schedule, Frequency, and Staggered Payments
Notes: “1b” means that the state pays recipients on the first business day of each month. Among the states in the sample, nine
states deliver on the 1st calendar day of each month, four states deliver on the 1st business day of each month, one state pays on
the 30th day, four states stagger payments among recipients, and three states (with thick outlines) have frequent payments.
is correlated to the timing of welfare payments,
then my estimate of the increase in domestic
violence near the transfer-delivery date will be
biased upward. One way to mitigate this potential
bias is to identify reports that are more likely to
be strategic. The NIBRS provides information on
whether the incident happened on the same day as
the reporting date or prior to the reporting date.10
If the incident happened prior to the reporting
date, the date of the actual incident is unknown.
The potential tendency for victims to report pre-
vious incidents of violence near the timing of the
welfare transfer is one example of reporting bias.
To avoid this issue, I limit data to incidents that
occurred on the same day as the report.11
Another limitation of the NIBRS is that it
does not state whether the victim was a welfare-
program participant. The reported cases of IPV,
therefore, include both victims who receive
TANF and those who do not. I control for
the most likely paycheck timings, to separate
the instrumental violence effect on reported
IPV, by distinguishing working families from
nonworking TANF families.
10. In the sample, about 85% of IPV was reported on the
same day as the reporting date.
11. One exception is Texas which does not provide infor-
mation on whether the incident happened on the same day as
the reporting date or previously.
C. Empirical Model and Summary Statistics
An ideal dataset would differentiate between
victims who receive TANF and victims who do
not. It would also provide detailed personal and
demographic information about offenders and
victims, as well as other sources of income for
TANF recipients. If instrumental violence is a
dominant effect, there would be more family vio-
lence in a working family shortly after receiving
a paycheck. If the paycheck is issued on the same
day as the TANF transfer, then any estimate of the
effect of TANF payments on domestic violence
would include this paycheck effect, and hence
be biased.
Employees receive paychecks at different
times, depending on the employer, but generally
they are paid weekly, biweekly, twice a month,
or monthly. Weekly or biweekly payments are
correlated with particular days of the week,
so my analysis controls for day of the week.
Monthly payments generally occur at the end of
the month, so I control for a 3-day period around
the end of the month. Twice-a-month payments
generally occur in the middle and at the end of
the month, so I also control for a 3-day period
around the middle of the month. I assume that
other payment timings are rare and independent
from TANF timings.
I construct two types of IPV variables: intim-
idation and assault, which includes aggravated
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assault and simple assault. The FBI’s UCR Pro-
gram defines aggravated assault as an attack with
severe physical injury that is usually inflicted
using a lethal weapon; simple assault is defined as
an assault without a lethal weapon; intimidation
is defined as a threat to cause physical harm with-
out displaying a weapon. I limit study subjects to
victims who are intimate partners of the offender;
this includes spouses, common-law spouses, ex-
spouses, and boyfriend-girlfriend pairs.12
The sample consists of 151 different agencies
in 143 core cities in 21 states. The 21 states are
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin.
More than half (62.2%) of sample cities’ data
are for 2001–2009, while a small proportion
(2.8%) of sample cities’ data are for 2008–2009
(see Table 2 for the list of jurisdictions and time
periods included in the analysis). In addition, I
separate the 21 states into two groups by fre-
quency of payment. Nonfrequent payment states
pay once a month and may stagger payments
among recipients, while frequent payment states
pay recipients twice a month.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics for
the nonfrequent payment sample and frequent
payment sample. Average daily reports of IPV
for the nonfrequent payment sample is 1.93 per
100,000 people, and 0.63 per 100,000 people
for the frequent payment sample. Panel A shows
the different rates of IPV by victim gender
and victim-offender relationship. Average daily
reports of female-on-male IPV are one-quarter
of the average daily reports of male-on-female
IPV, and therefore I focus on male-on-female
IPV. For male-on-female IPV in the nonfre-
quent payment (frequent payment) sample,
64% (73%) of the victims are girlfriends, and
36% (27%) are wives or ex-wives. Panel B
presents the type of male-on-female IPV. The
most common offense between intimate partners
is simple assault (Durose et al. 2005); assaults
are reported 7–10 times as often as intimida-
tion. To get a better picture of the degree of
underreporting of intimidation and assault, we
can compare police report data to victim survey
data. For nonfatal IPV, 33% of female victims
stated that they were physically attacked, and
67% of female victims stated that they were
12. In Texas, intimate partners are defined as spouses or
common-law spouses.
threatened with bodily harm,13 according to
the National Crime Victimization Survey for
2001–2005 (Catalano 2006). This suggests that
verbal violence is underreported more often than
physical violence.
The standard deviation of the daily count of
IPV is greater than the mean of the daily count of
IPV. This suggests that estimates derived from a
Poisson model will lead to spurious inferences. I
use a negative binomial model because its specifi-
cation is robust to overdispersion (Aizer and Dal
Bó 2009). The empirical model is:
(1) DVst = F
(
λst, θ
)
ln
(
λst
)
= β0 + β1Dummy for Index ≥ 0 and
(2)
< 4st + β2Dummy for Day 30, 31, 1t
+β3Dummy for Day 14, 15, 16t + αs + δMontht
+γYeart +
∑
n
λnHn +
∑
m
λmDm + εst
where s indicates agency and t indicates date.
θ is the overdispersion parameter, and λst is the
expected daily count of domestic violence by
agency. DVs,t is the daily count of assault or
intimidation of a female intimate partner reported
by agency s.Dummy for Index≥ 0 and< 4st is the
dummy for the first 4 days since receiving the
TANF transfer in each state. If the husband uses
violence as a tool to extract money, I expect that
more domestic violence, especially intimidation,
will be reported on the delivery day. I chose the
first 4 days since receiving the TANF transfer for
two reasons. First, some states pay a portion of
their recipients by mailing checks, which usually
take 1–3 days to arrive. Second, a state with
staggered payments does not have a single day
in a month on which everyone has just received a
welfare payment—that is, index is always greater
than zero. See Appendix A in Appendix S1 for a
detailed example.
Agency fixed effects (αs) control for the
time-invariant characteristics in each agency;
for example, some police agencies are more
vigilant when reporting domestic violence than
others. Day-of-week fixed effects control for
differences in domestic violence across days of
the week. Year and month fixed effects capture
yearly and monthly crime variation, including
13. Note that “threat of bodily harm” includes cases in
which a weapon is brandished. In the NIBRS, intimidation
is defined as the threat of bodily harm without displaying
a weapon.
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TABLE 2
Jurisdictions Included In the Analysis
Jurisdiction Year in Sample Jurisdiction Year in Sample
Akron, OH 2001–2009 College Station, TX 2001–2009
Alexandria, VA 2004–2009 Corpus Christi, TX 2001–2009
Ames, IA 2002–2009 Danville, VA 2001–2009
Anderson, SC 2001–2009 Davenport, IA 2001–2009
Auburn, ME 2007–2009 Dayton, OH 2001–2009
Aurora, CO 2002–2009 Denver, CO 2005–2009
Abilene, TX 2001–2009 Des Moines, IA 2001–2009
Amarillo, TX 2001–2009 Dubuque, IA 2001–2009
Arlington, TX 2001–2009 Dallas, TX 2001–2009
Austin, TX 2001–2009 Easley, SC 2005–2009
Bend, OR 2005–2009 Elyria, OH 2005–2009
Bentonville, AR 2008–2009 Edinburg, TX 2001–2009
Bismarck, ND 2004–2009 El Paso, TX 2001–2009
Blacksburg, VA 2002–2009 Fargo, ND 2001–2009
Boardman, OH 2004–2009 Florence, SC 2001–2009
Bossier City, LA 2003–2009 Fond du Lac, WI 2006–2009
Bristol, TN 2001–2009 Fort Collins, CO 2006–2009
Broomfield, CO 2007–2009 Franklin, TN 2005–2009
Burlington, VT 2001–2009 Fort Worth, TX 2001–2009
Baytown, TX 2001–2009 Grand Forks, ND 2001–2009
Beaumont, TX 2001–2009 Grand Junction, CO 2001–2009
Brownsville, TX 2001–2009 Greeley, CO 2005–2009
Bryan, TX 2001–2009 Greenville, SC 2001–2009
Cedar Rapids, IA 2001–2009 Hampton, VA 2001–2009
Charleston, SC 2001–2009 Harrisonburg, VA 2002–2009
Charlottesville, VA 2001–2009 Hot Springs, AR 2002–2009
Chattanooga, TN 2001–2009 Harlingen, TX 2001–2009
Christiansburg, VA 2002–2009 Houston, TX 2001–2009
Cincinnati, OH 2001–2009 Iowa City, IA 2001–2009
Clarksville, TN 2001–2009 Jackson, TN 2001–2009
Cleveland, OH 2002–2009 Johnson City, TN 2001–2009
Colorado Springs, CO 2001–2009 Jonesboro, AR 2003–2009
Columbia, SC 2001–2009 Kingsport, TN 2001–2009
Columbus, OH 2003–2009 Knoxville, TN 2001–2009
Conway, AR 2002–2009 Killeen, TX 2001–2009
Corvallis, OR 2005–2009 La Crosse, WI 2008–2009
Council Bluffs, IA 2001–2009 Lawrence, KS 2001–2009
Cranston, RI 2004–2009 Lewiston, ME 2007–2009
Little Rock, AR 2002–2009 Round Rock, TX 2001–2009
Lynchburg, VA 2001–2009 Sioux City, IA 2001–2009
Laredo, TX 2001–2009 Sioux Falls, SD 2005–2009
Longview, TX 2001–2009 South Burlington, VT 2002–2009
Lubbock, TX 2001–2009 South Portland, ME 2005–2009
Mansfield, OH 2005–2009 Spartanburg, SC 2001–2009
Mauldin, SC 2005–2009 Stamford, CT 2005–2009
Medford, OR 2005–2009 Summerville, SC 2006–2009
Memphis, TN 2001–2009 Sumter, SC 2001–2009
Milwaukee, WI 2004–2009 San Angelo, TX 2001–2009
Missoula, MT 2005–2009 San Antonio, TX 2001–2009
Morristown, TN 2002–2009 San Marcos, TX 2001–2009
Murfreesboro, TN 2001–2009 Sherman, TX 2001–2009
Myrtle Beach, SC 2001–2009 Sugar Land, TX 2001–2009
McAllen, TX 2001–2009 Tacoma, WA 2007–2009
Midland, TX 2001–2009 Temple, TX 2001–2009
Mission, TX 2001–2009 Texarkana, TX 2001–2009
Nashua, NH 2005–2009 Tyler, TX 2001–2009
Nashville, TN 2001–2009 Virginia Beach, VA 2001–2009
New Haven, CT 2001–2009 Victoria, TX 2001–2009
New London, CT 2001–2009 Warren, OH 2008–2009
Newport News, VA 2001–2009 Warwick, RI 2004–2009
Norfolk, VA 2001–2009 Waterloo, IA 2001–2009
North Charleston, SC 2001–2009 West Hartford, CT 2007–2009
North Little Rock, AR 2003–2009 Wichita, KS 2001–2009
North Myrtle Beach, SC 2002–2009 Winchester, VA 2002–2009
Norwalk, CT 2001–2009 Waco, TX 2001–2009
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TABLE 2
Continued
Jurisdiction Year in Sample Jurisdiction Year in Sample
New Braunfels, TX 2001–2009 Wichita Falls, TX 2001–2009
Odessa, TX 2001–2009 Youngstown, OH 2004–2009
Portsmouth, VA 2001–2009
Providence, RI 2006–2009
Port Arthur, TX 2001–2009
Radford, VA 2005–2009
Rapid City, SD 2006–2009
Richmond, VA 2001–2009
Roanoke, VA 2001–2009
Rock Hill, SC 2001–2009
Rogers, AR 2008–2009
TABLE 3
Summary Statistics for Intimate Partner Violence
Daily Number of Offenses/100,000 People
Mean Median Std. Error
Fraction in
(Sub)Category
For nonfrequent payment sample
Panel A. All IPV 1.93 1.21 2.50 1.00
Male on female 1.54 0.90 2.06 0.80
Against wife 0.56 0.00 1.15 0.36
Against girlfriend 0.98 0.00 1.57 0.64
Female on male 0.39 0.00 0.93 0.20
Against husband 0.16 0.00 0.58 0.41
Against boyfriend 0.23 0.00 0.69 0.59
Panel B. Male on female
Intimidation 0.19 0.00 0.66 0.12
Assault 1.34 0.65 1.89 0.88
Index 14.70 15.00 8.72 1.00
For frequent payment sample
Panel A. All IPV 0.63 0.00 1.23 1.00
Male on female 0.51 0.00 1.08 0.81
Against wife 0.14 0.00 0.55 0.27
Against girlfriend 0.37 0.00 0.91 0.73
Female on male 0.12 0.00 0.51 0.19
Against husband 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.29
Against boyfriend 0.09 0.00 0.43 0.72
Panel B. Male on female
Intimidation 0.05 0.00 0.30 0.09
Assault 0.47 0.00 1.04 0.90
Index 7.14 7.00 4.44 1.00
Notes: Data are reports of domestic violence to police agencies in NIBRS and are limited to incidents that occurred on the
same day as reported to the police. Nonfrequent payment states pay once a month. Frequent payment states pay recipients twice
a month. Sample jurisdictions are listed in Table 2. An intimate partner is defined as a spouse (including common-law spouses
and ex-spouses) or a boyfriend/girlfriend. Violence includes intimidation and assault.
seasonal effects. Hn indicates a set of dummy
variables for federal holidays. The indicator Dm
represents the dummy for each day of the week.
Dummy forDay 30, 31, 1t is a paycheck dummy
equal to one if the day equals to the 30th, 31st,
or the 1st. Dummy forDay 14, 15, 16t is another
paycheck dummy equal to one if the day equals to
the 14th, 15th, or 16th. Paycheck dummies cap-
ture the possible increase in domestic violence
after receiving a paycheck. It also separates
domestic violence between working couples and
the majority of TANF recipients.14
Daily changes in demographic characteristics
are subtle, and therefore I did not control for
demographic data such as population, race, or
14. About 22% of recipients work, according to the 2010
national TANF file.
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income, and instead relied on agency-level fixed
effects to capture these variables.
Identification Strategy and Hypothesis. I test the
instrumental violence hypothesis that the man
uses violence to control the woman’s behavior
when the welfare transfer occurs. Formally, the
hypothesis is as follows:
H0: β1 = 0; HA: β1 > 0
To identify the causal effect of the exogenous
timing of TANF transfers on IPV, I control for
the most likely paycheck timings, differentiating
the paycheck effect from the TANF-based effect.
Also, to avoid potential reporting bias, I only
include those incidents that occur on the same day
as the report.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
A. Impact of the Timing of Welfare Payment on
Domestic Violence
I estimate the effects of the timing of TANF
payments on domestic violence using the empir-
ical strategy described in the previous section.
I include day-of-week, year, and month fixed
effects. The dependent variable is the number of
reports of these two types of domestic violence,
and the unit of observation is an agency-day cell.
Table 4 presents the estimated effects of the
timing of welfare transfers on the two types of
IPV using a negative binomial regression with
incidence rate ratio (IRR) in brackets. I find that
the evidence supports the hypothesis that the hus-
band uses violence as an instrument to control
the household’s resource distribution shortly after
receiving the TANF transfer. It suggests that more
females report IPV within 4 days of receiving
welfare transfers. Specifically, in columns (1) and
(2), the estimated IRRs for Dummy for Index ≥0
and <4 are greater than 1 and significant under
intimidation and assault. The IRR of Dummy for
day 30, 31, 1 is significantly greater than 1 under
intimidation, suggesting a positive relationship
between the timing of paychecks and intimida-
tion (column 1). The IRR suggests that, in the first
4 days after receiving welfare transfers, reports
of women being intimidated by their intimate
partner increase by a factor of 1.046; reports of
women being assaulted by their intimate part-
ner increase by a factor of 1.007. Appendix B
in Appendix S1 further discusses the estimated
effect of welfare payments on IPV for the TANF
population specifically.
B. Impact of Frequent, Small Welfare Payments
on Domestic Violence
To test whether the frequency of the transfer
has an impact on domestic violence, I interact the
Dummy for Index ≥0 and <4 and a dummy vari-
able Frequency that equals to one in states that
pay recipients twice a month. Table 4 shows the
results in columns (3) and (4). In the first 4 days
after receiving welfare transfers, women report
more intimidation by a factor of 1.05 in the non-
frequent payment states. This effect of welfare
payments decreases by a factor of 0.755 when
the state pays twice a month. In other words, dur-
ing the first 4 days after receiving welfare pay-
ments, women report intimidation 21% less often
in frequent payment states. The effect of welfare
payments on assault is smaller than on intimi-
dation in nonfrequent payment states, and there
is insufficient evidence to suggest a difference
between frequent payment and nonfrequent pay-
ment states in this regard.
This implies that instrumental violence ceases
to be the dominant effect when the transfer is
rationed out in smaller, more frequent amounts.
Using threats as a way to extract money from
the wife is no longer worthwhile for the husband
because the money is too little to fight over at any
one time.
C. Additional Specifications
In this section, I test alternative specifica-
tions and perform robustness checks. First, to
obtain empirical evidence that the main result
is robust to changes in the specification of the
index dummy, I perform a sensitivity analysis
by investigating the linear relationship between
the payment-timing index and domestic vio-
lence. Second, I address the concern that IPV
reports from the entire population may not be
representative of IPV victims who receive TANF
by testing to determine whether variations by
state in the TANF recipient ratio alter my anal-
ysis. Third, I test an alternative explanation for
these results—namely, that TANF recipients use
TANF money to buy alcohol and drugs, which
fuels expressive violence—by restricting the
dependent variable to only include IPV com-
mitted by sober offenders. Lastly, I conduct a
placebo test by randomly assigning the value of
Dummy for Index ≥0 and <4.
Sensitivity Analysis. The specification in Table 4
investigates the relationship between the near-
delivery-day dummy and domestic violence. In
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TABLE 4
Timing of TANF Payments and IPV
Intimidation Assault Intimidation Assault
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dummy for index≥ 0 and <4 0.045*** 0.007* 0.049*** 0.007*
(0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
[1.046] [1.007] [1.050] [1.007]
Dummy for index≥ 0 and <4*frequency −0.282*** −0.033
(0.068) (0.033)
[0.755] [0.967]
Dummy for days 30, 31, 1 0.130*** 0.004 0.131*** 0.004
(0.032) (0.007) (0.032) (0.007)
[1.139] [1.004] [1.140] [1.004]
Dummy for days 14–16 0.020 −0.004 0.022 −0.004
(0.015) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006)
[1.021] [0.996] [1.022] [0.996]
Constant −5.867*** −1.674*** −5.868*** −1.674***
(0.101) (0.084) (0.101) (0.084)
[0.003] [0.188] [0.003] [0.188]
Observations 420,608 420,608 420,608 420,608
Log likelihood −127,514 −445,660 −127,511 −445,659
Notes: Dummy for index ≥0 and <4 equals to 1 if the average number of days since last receiving a welfare payment is
less than 4 days. Frequency equals to one in the frequent payment sample. All regressions include various U.S. federal holiday
dummies, day-of-week fixed effect, year fixed effect, month fixed effect, and agency fixed effect. The unit of observation is
agency-day. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state, and IRRs are in brackets.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
Table 5, I analyze the linear relationship between
the payment timing index and domestic violence.
The IRR in column (1) suggests that when the
index increases by one, reports of intimidation
decrease by a factor of 0.998. Results show that
there is a small and negative linear relationship
between days since the last welfare transfer and
intimidation; there is no linear relationship, how-
ever, between days since the last welfare payment
and physical violence.
Alternative Dependent Variable. The impact of
welfare payment timing on IPVmay differ among
states, since each state has a different TANF
recipient ratio; this ranges from 0.15% to 2.28%
(Table 1). To determine whether variation in the
TANF recipient ratio alters my analysis, I esti-
mate the TANF-recipient-IPV count, which is
the IPV count of the entire population times
the monthly TANF recipient ratio (%) by each
state. The monthly TANF recipient ratio is the
monthly number of TANF recipients divided by
the annual population in each state. Data on
TANF recipients in each state come from the
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services,
and population data from the Population Division
of the U.S. Census Bureau. Table 6 shows the
estimation of Table 4 with TANF-recipient-IPV
as the dependent variable. Estimated IRRs for the
TABLE 5
Linear Relationship between Timing of TANF
Payments and IPV
Intimidation Assault
(1) (2)
Index −0.002*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)
[0.998] [1.000]
Dummy for days 30, 31, 1 0.148*** 0.005
(0.036) (0.007)
[1.160] [1.005]
Dummy for day 14–16 0.014 −0.005
(0.016) (0.005)
[1.014] [0.995]
Constant −5.827*** −1.938***
(0.123) (0.087)
[0.003] [0.144]
Observations 420,608 420,608
Log likelihood −127,513 −445,660
Notes: Index is the average number of days since last pay-
ment. Both regressions include various U.S. federal holiday
dummies, day-of-week fixed effect, year fixed effect, month
fixed effect, and agency fixed effect. The unit of observation
is agency-day. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clus-
tered by state, and IRRs are in brackets.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
Dummy for Index≥ 0 and< 4 are similar to those
in Table 4.
Alcohol/Drug-Fueled Expressive Violence Test.
In addition to instrumental violence theory, there
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TABLE 6
Timing of TANF Payments and Estimated
TANF-Recipient IPV
Intimidation Assault
(1) (2)
Dummy for index≥ 0 and <4 0.048*** 0.009***
(0.010) (0.003)
[1.050] [1.009]
Dummy for days 30, 31, 1 0.144*** 0.006
(0.024) (0.007)
[1.155] [1.006]
Dummy for days 14–16 0.021 −0.001
(0.015) (0.006)
[1.021] [0.999]
Constant −5.861*** −1.873***
(0.226) (0.243)
[0.003] [0.154]
Observation 420,608 420,608
Log likelihood −153,131 −492,478
Notes: The dependent variable is the estimated count of
TANF-recipient IPV, which is calculated as the counts of
IPV times the TANF participation ratio. Dummy for Index
≥0 and <4 equals to 1 if the average number of days since
last receiving a welfare payment is less than 4 days. Both
regressions include various U.S. federal holiday dummies,
day-of-week fixed effect, year fixed effect, month fixed effect,
and agency fixed effect. The unit of observation is agency-day.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state,
and IRRs are in brackets.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
may be other explanations for why IPV increases
around the time of a welfare transfer. For
instance, IPV could be triggered by additional
alcohol or drug consumption when a welfare pay-
ment increases the abuser’s income. To test this
alternative explanation of alcohol/drug-fueled
expressive violence, I restrict the dependent
variable to include only IPV committed by
sober offenders.15 Within this sample, 90.17%
of intimidation offenses are committed by sober
offenders, and 82.59% of assaults are commit-
ted by sober offenders. Results are reported in
Table 7. In the first 4 days after receiving welfare
transfers, females report more intimidation by
their sober intimate partners. The IRR (1.041) is
similar to the IRR (1.046) in Table 4. However,
the effect of welfare payments on assault by sober
intimate partners is not significant. This suggests
that receipt of a TANF transfer leads to more
alcohol/drug-based physical IPV, which lends
credence to a strong expressive violence effect.
At the same time, the increase in sober
intimidation is strong evidence of instrumental
15. This information is available in the NIBRS, but not
in the Family Violence Report from Texas Dept. of Public
Safety. Therefore, I exclude the State of Texas in Table 7.
TABLE 7
Timing of TANF Payments and IPV with Sober
Offenders
Intimidation Assault
(1) (2)
Dummy for index≥ 0 and <4 0.040*** −0.002
(0.010) (0.005)
[1.041] [0.998]
Dummy for days 30, 31, 1 0.143*** 0.004
(0.037) (0.007)
[1.154] [1.004]
Dummy for days 14–16 0.021 −0.005
(0.015) (0.005)
[1.021] [0.995]
Constant −6.017*** −1.805***
(0.107) (0.090)
[0.002] [0.165]
Observations 279,657 279,657
Log likelihood −111,293 −318,115
Notes: Dummy for Index ≥0 and <4 equals to 1 if the
average number of days since last receiving a welfare pay-
ment is less than 4 days. Both regressions include various U.S.
federal holiday dummies, day-of-week fixed effect, year fixed
effect, month fixed effect, and agency fixed effect. The unit of
observation is agency-day. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses are clustered by state, and IRRs are in brackets. Data
from Texas were excluded due to lack of information on the
offender’s sobriety.
*p< 0.1; **p< 0.05; ***p< 0.01.
violence. This result highlights the behavioral
differences between instrumental and expressive
violence. The former is a strategic negotiating
tactic, which if successful does not require
physical violence; the latter, in contrast, is an
expression of emotion, which can be exac-
erbated by drugs and alcohol. This result is
consistent with a model of asymmetric infor-
mation in household bargaining (Bobonis,
González-Brenes, and Castro 2013).
Placebo Test. To determine whether a causal
relationship exists between the timing of welfare
payments and IPV, I randomize the value of the
Dummy for Index ≥0 and <4 and estimate its
effects on domestic violence for the whole sam-
ple. I find no evidence that the randomized tim-
ing of welfare payment has any effect on either
IPV measure.
VI. CONCLUSION
I examine the effect of the timing of TANF
transfer payments on reports of IPV, specif-
ically intimidation and assault. By analyzing
patterns of domestic violence in 151 core-city
police agencies over the course of TANF transfer
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payments in 21 states, I find a causal relation-
ship between timing close to welfare payments
and IPV against women.
Using NIBRS crime data and the TANF
payment schedule, I provide empirical evidence
to support the hypothesis that the husband uses
intimidation as an instrument to control house-
hold resources. When I restrict the analysis to
sober offenders, I find no evidence that phys-
ical violence increases right after the welfare
payment, which suggests that the increase in
male-on-female physical assault around the
time of welfare payment is associated with
alcohol use.
Taking advantage of differences in transfer
frequency among states, I interact the dummy
variable representing the time near TANF deliv-
ery date and the dummy variable representing
frequent payment states. Results suggest that a
smaller, more spread-out welfare transfer does
not motivate the husband to use verbal violence to
control the household resource allocation. How-
ever, there is not enough evidence to suggest
that the effect of welfare payments on assault
decreases in frequent payment states. I conjec-
ture that increasing the frequency of welfare pay-
ments could mitigate the welfare payment effect
on intimidation. However, this analysis does not
rule out the possibility that increasing the fre-
quency of payments could lead to more frequent
incidences of alcohol-fueled physical violence.
For policy makers, this study offers insights
on policy design regarding the prediction and
reduction of domestic violence. It will also assist
police, shelters, and hospitals to efficiently assign
workers over the cycle of welfare payment to
accommodate potential increases in domestic-
violence reports and battered victims.
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